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III.
INTRODUCTION
This is a case where a Highway Patrol Trooper with high
amounts of prescription drugs in his system hit and killed Michael
Kouris while Michael was crossing the street on his bike. Although
eyewitness and expert testimony contradict the State's position, it
asserts that there are no disputed facts.
Additionally, the State mistakenly argues that this Court
should

not

look

beyond

governmental

immunity.

However, if

governmental immunity is not an absolute defense, the State has not
contested that other duties exist such as a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances.
Finally, in arguing its brief, the State asserted a number of
errant technical points.
at the end of this brief.

These are addressed in a separate point

IV.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IF THERE ARE FACTS IN DISPUTE, THE COURT
WILL NOT EVEN REACH THE IMMUNITY ISSUE
The parties' briefs take opposite positions on the analytical
Kourises7 opening brief argues that the

approach to this case.

analysis should begin by determining what duties apply.
Appellant at p.39-41.)

(Brief of

On the other hand, the State's brief argues

that the analysis should begin and end with immunity.

(Brief of

Appellee at p.11-14.)
Kourises still vigorously contend that the Court should begin
its analysis by addressing duty.

(See POINT III below.)

However,

for purposes of this section (POINT I) Kourises will agree arguendo
that the analysis should begin with immunity.
Any argument on immunity begins with U.C.A. § 41-6-14 (1998)
(see Exhibit A ) . Indeed, the State concedes that there can be no
immunity

if

that

section

has

been

Defendants/Appellees at p. 15-22).

violated.

contends

that

there

violations of § 41-6-14

are

no

of

But, whether or not there has

been a violation of § 41-6-14 is a fact issue.
State

(Brief

facts

Specifically, the

in dispute

regarding

(Brief of Appellee at p.15-16).

On the

other hand, Kourises argue that there are several factual disputes
regarding § 41-6-14.

(See POINT II below.)

the analysis should begin with immunity.
-2-

The State argues that

However, any analysis of

immunity must be based upon undisputed facts.

If there are facts

in dispute, the Court cannot opine about immunity and the case must
be remanded.
Yet, if the Court remands because there are conflicting facts,
the duty/immunity issue would still remain back in the trial court.
In other words, on remand, what were the Highway Patrol and Trooper
Childs' duties and does immunity attach?
a duty not to drive impaired?
crosswalk?

Did he have

Did Trooper Childs have

Did he have a duty not to pass at a

a duty of reasonable

care under the

circumstances?
In summary, Kourises urge this Court to reverse and remand
because these are disputed issues of fact

(see POINT II below.)

However, even if this Court reverses and remands on the ground of
disputed fact issues, Kourises urge this Court to instruct the
trial court on the duty/immunity issues--thus avoiding

another

appeal and possibly another trial.
POINT II
THERE ARE KEY ISSUES OF DISPUTED FACT
The State's brief relies on the trial court's list of "undisputed"
facts.

(Appellee's Memorandum at p. 15-16.)

The State mistakenly

asserts that these "undisputed facts" are indeed undisputed.

The

State also mistakenly asserts there are no other disputed facts.
However, on summary judgment, a trial

court

cannot weigh

disputed evidence. Bill Brown Realty Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238,

-3-

239

(Utah 1978). If there is any dispute, those facts, and the

inferences drawn must be interpreted in a light most favorable to
Kourises.
1989).

Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah

This section will demonstrate that there are several fact

disputes.
1.

Trooper Childs7 Drug Impairment Can Be Established Even
Without Expert Testimony.
A central issue in this case is whether or not Trooper Childs

was impaired by drugs at the time of the accident.
relied,
However,

in part,
there

on

are

the
also

evidence in the Record.
The State's Memorandum

expert

testimony

documentary

of

Dr.

admissions,

Kourises

Struempler.
and

factual

(See Memorandum of Appellant at p. 6-9).
challenges the expert

testimony of Dr.

Struempler (Appellee's Memorandum at p. 22-3 0) . However, the State
has totally ignored the documentary admissions and factual evidence
regarding Trooper Childs' drug impairment.
Specifically, Trooper Childs had a long and documented history
of prescription drug problems.

He had been taking prescription

narcotics for many years. R. 373.

Because of its concern over his

drug use, the Highway Patrol sent Trooper Childs for numerous
medical exams.

Appellant's Brief pg. 6-11.

The result of many of

those medical exams were findings that Trooper Childs was impaired
and unsafe to drive.

Id.

Still, the Highway Patrol chose to

ignore those medical recommendations that he be taken off the road.
By the time of the Kouris accident, Trooper Childs was taking three
-4-

times the amount of the same medications that had impaired him at
the time of those medical evaluations.

Id.

At the time of the

Kouris accident, he had blood levels of those medications that far
exceeded his prescribed dosage.

Id.

As a result of his history and continued problems, the Highway
Patrol concluded:
...Trooper Childs is not able to make the decision
to rehabilitate from the prescribed medication in order
to be able to drive safely...Because of his prescribed
medication use, Trooper Childs i[s] not able to perform
his functions as a field trooper with the Utah Highway
Patrol. (R. 652, pg 3, 578).
In short, even the Highway Patrol thought he was unsafe to drive
because of the drugs!
The State also ignores the facts from which a jury could
conclude that Trooper Childs was impaired.
Childs intended to pass Tammy Auberger.

For example, Trooper

She was approaching an

intersection and was stopping at a crosswalk.
passed her.

He accelerated and

Even assuming the State's version of the facts,

Trooper Childs did not turn on any lights or signals until he had
passed

Auberger.

R.

408, 411.

His

reaction

was

slow.

An

unimpaired driver would have turned lights on in ample time.
Second, the other eyewitnesses clearly saw children in and
around the crosswalk. R. 396, 398-403, 405.
Childs did not see any.

However, Trooper

The unimpaired drivers (eyewitnesses) saw

what the impaired driver did not.

-5-

Thus, the admission by the Highway Patrol; the extensive drug
history; and Trooper Childs' lack of perception at the time of the
accident

are all

facts from which a jury could conclude

Trooper Childs was impaired.

that

Those facts should preclude summary

j udgment.
2.

A Factual Dispute Exists With Regard to the Radio Call.
The State argues that the dispatch call made prior to the

accident made an emergency response appropriate.

However, to meet

the prerequisites of the statute, the call must be an emergency
call and the Trooper must respond to the call as an emergency. See
Appellant's

Opening

Brief pg. 29, §41-6-14 U.C.A.

There

are

factual disputes as to both issues.
In support of its contention that Trooper Childs' response was
justified as an emergency, the State mischaracterizes testimony and
relies on Trooper Childs' after the fact account. R. 187.
The State argues that Kourises' own accident reconstruction
expert testified that the call was an "emergency call."
Even plaintiff's reconstruction expert, Ronald
Probert (see R. 107), acknowledged that it was within
Trooper Childs' discretion to respond to the situation
as an emergency (R.2 84) . Not a shred of record evidence
supports plaintiffs' contention that a genuine issue of
material fact exists regarding the propriety of Trooper
Childs' election to respond to the call as an emergency.
Appellee's Brief pg. 18.
Conveniently

omitted

from

the

State's

summation

evidence was Mr. Probert's opinion on the same page:

-6-

of

that

Q: If Cortland Childs's supervisor were to say that
he believed this was a legitimate emergency response,
would that affect your opinion?
A: I read that. Sergeant Kelly. And again, it's an
opinion. I guess I'm looking at this and saying, I don't
see this as the emergency response that Cortland Childs
did. R. 284
Indeed, three pages earlier in the same deposition Mr. Probert
testified:
I don't think that - I've already said that. I don't
think that in my classification I would look at this as
an emergency. .. .He believed it was. And I think it was
unreasonable. I don't think that that was correct.
In addition
Officer

Allred

to

Probert's

discussed

in

testimony
Kourises'

and

the

opening

testimony

memo1,

of

Trooper

Childs' actions immediately before the accident conflict sharply
with the statements he made after the accident.

The State ignores

Trooper Child's actions and looks only at his later, self-serving
statement that he was responding to an emergency.
Eyewitness testimony raises factual disputes as to whether the
call was an emergency and whether Trooper Childs treated it as an
emergency.

Specifically, Trooper Childs heard the dispatch call

while driving south on Highway 10, about a mile from where Michael
was hit. R. 382, 385-86. He made a U-turn and began to head north
(toward the intersection where Michael was hit) on Carbon Avenue
1

Due to a clerical error, a page of the deposition was
omitted from appellants' opening brief. They are included here
for full disclosure to the Court. See Exh. B.

-7-

following directly behind Tammy Auberger.

R.385-86.

During that

time, Ms. Auberger drove at the posted speed limit of 45 MPH. Id.
About a quarter of a mile from the point of impact, the speed
limit changed to 30 MPH.

Ms. Auberger slowed to 30 MPH as did

Trooper Childs behind her.

At no point did Trooper Childs exceed

the speed limit, attempt to pass her, or turn on any lights,
sirens, or signal devices. R. 3 98.
Finally, as Ms. Auberger approached the intersection, she
began to stop to allow Michael to cross the street. R. 393. It was
only as she was stopping that Trooper Childs sped up and pulled
around her.
Thus,

Still, she saw no lights or sirens. R. 408, 411.
after

getting

the

call,

Trooper

Ms. Auberger for approximately one mile.
distance while going the speed limit.

Childs

followed

He followed at a normal

He slowed when she slowed.

He did not turn on any lights and appeared to be in no hurry
whatsoever.

Only when Ms. Auberger began to stop did Trooper

Child's suddenly accelerate, swerve around her, and turn on his
lights.

I

The accident happened a second or two later.

Thus there are factual disputes as to whether this was an
emergency and whether Trooper Childs treated the call as an
emergency.

Both factual question must be resolved in order to

decide if governmental immunity applies.

-8-

3.

A Factual Dispute Exists as to Where Michael Was at the Time
of The Accident.
The trial court concluded and the State argues that it is

undisputed that Michael was outside the crosswalk when he was hit.
The State also argues that Michael's location is immaterial.
Appellee's Brief pg.19,20. However, Michael's location is material
for at least two reasons and is disputed by eyewitness testimony.
First, in its Memorandum Opinion, the trial court cited
Michael's location as an undisputed fact. R. 612. It then granted
summary judgment based on its opinion that Michael was outside the
crosswalk. Thus, Michael's location is a material fact because the
trial court thought it was material and based summary judgment
thereon.
Secondly, this is an intersection auto/pedestrian case. The
central issues in nearly all automobile intersection cases center
around time, speed, distance, visibility, etc. It seems axiomatic
that the locations of the people involved are material. Each
persons position in relation to one another is critical to the
decision making process.

A fact decided one way effects how the

next fact fits in the puzzle.

The location of the pedestrian and

the vehicle are keystone facts. Here, the State cannot simply say
that Trooper Childs' lights were on when Trooper Childs hit
Michael, unless the State knows where Michael was.
Finally, in addition to arguing that Michael's location is
immaterial, the State argues that his location is undisputed.
-9-

In

doing so, the State cites to an inadmissible police report and
simply ignores conflicting eyewitness testimony.
pg.19.

Appellee's Brief

The conflicting, eyewitness testimony, was that:

...It made no sense that the police officer, with
the kids crossing the crosswalk, would turn on his lights
and speed off like that. R.363, 416, 548, 651 pg.2., 652
pg. 4 6 (Emphasis added).
4.

There is a Factual Dispute as to Whether Trooper Childs7
Lights Were On.
The State argues as an undisputed fact that Trooper Childs

activated his emergency lights before the accident. Actually, when
he

activated

his

lights

interprets the conflicting
itself.

is

very

much

disputed.

The

State

facts in a light most favorable to

Again, the State is not entitled to that viewpoint.

Blue

Cross at 636.
Testimony by witness Tammy Auberger provides evidence that
there were no lights on Trooper Childs car until he had passed her.
R. 408. Id.

This puts him past her car and in to the intersection.

Yet, where exactly was Michael?

Was he directly in the crosswalk?

Was he in the unmarked crosswalk?
These

unknown

questions

are

the

precise

reason

why

the

disputed facts regarding Michael and Trooper Child's locations are
critical.

They create material issues of disputed fact as to

whether or not Trooper Childs turned on his lights before the point
of impact.

-10-

5.

A Factual Dispute Exists as to Whether Trooper Childs Acted
Reasonably.
As argued in its opening brief, Kourises continue to assert

that

§41-6-14

circumstances.

contains

a

duty

of

reasonable

care

under

the

Even if Trooper Childs turned his lights on a split

second before he hit Michael, is he now immune?

If this Court

agrees that a duty of reasonable care exists, then even under the
State's view of the facts, a dispute exists as to whether Trooper
Childs acted reasonably.2
POINT III
THE COURT MUST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DUTY
Kourises have argued in Point I above, that if there are
disputed issues of fact, it will not be necessary for the Court to
address immunity.

However, regardless of the factual outcome, the

Court must address duty.

In other words, it is not possible to

analyze Trooper Childs' and the Highway Patrol's immunity without
first determining what duties apply.
Appellant at p.33-38.)

(See generally Brief of

Again, the lower court erred by ruling on

immunity without first determining the duty.

(Id.)

The State argues that it is not necessary to examine the issue
of duty. Appellee's Brief pg.12.

In support of this position, the

State cites Ledfords v. Emery County School Dist., 849 P.2d 1162

2

The issue of whether or not Trooper Childs acted reasonably is
related to the legal issue of Trooper Childs' duty. See POINT
III below.
-11-

(Utah 1993). Id. There, the State quotes selectively from Ledfords
stating that it would be improper to analyze duty first.
In some of our past cases in which we analyzed such
a claim against a governmental entity, we have begun with
a traditional tort analysis to determine whether the
plaintiff had alleged a legally cognizable duty and
breach of duty.
If the plaintiff had not stated a
legally valid tort cause of action, we usually have
declined to undertake the immunity analysis. At other
times, we have performed the immunity analysis first,
typically when it ended the inquiry.
ie

*

*

Whatever the order in which we address the
questions, it is important to keep in mind that a
legislative waiver of immunity is not a legislative
consent to liability.
Even when immunity is waived,
there can be no liability absent a breach of a common law
duty owed to the plaintiff. Appellee' s Brief pg. 13,
quoting Ledfords at 1163-64.
However, the State's analysis left out the next paragraph in
the opinion which explains the Court's current position and its
reasoning for not adhering to that position in Ledfords:
In our more recent cases, we have tended to address the
traditional tort questions first, for the sake of
analytical clarity and of keeping distinct the questions
of immunity and liability. However, in the present case,
the parties have made it easy for us to decide whether to
begin with immunity or duty.
They did not brief the
issue of [duty]...Ledfords at 1164, emphasis added.
Here, the question of whether the Highway Patrol owed Kourises
a duty has been before the court from the first summary judgment
motion.
In addition to §41-6-76, other statutes created a duty of
care towards Michael.
For example, the trooper was
driving with drugs[] in his system, he passed a vehicle
stopped at a crosswalk, and he failed to take reasonable
precautions for people in the crosswalk.
In each
instance there are Utah statutes that create a specific
-12-

duty of care
pedestrian...

that

runs

from

the

Trooper

to

the

In addition to specific State statutes cited above,
the Highway Patrol's own internal policy for responding
to emergency calls creates an even higher duty of care...
R. 365-366 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Kourises extensively argued to the trial court that there were
duties from which the Highway Patrol and the State are not immune.
Id., R. 547-550, R.592-93, R.561 pg.20, etc.

Moreover, these duty

arguments were a major theme of Kourises' brief before this Court.
Appellants' brief pg.33-41.

In summary, the issue of duty was

plainly argued below and extensively briefed to this Court.

It is

necessary that the duties be determined before looking at immunity.

POINT IV
TROOPER CHILDS' DRUG USE PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion
Struempler's Opinion Testimony.

When

The trial court erred in excluding Struempler's
because it applied the wrong law.

Ruling

on

affidavit

The trial court's Memorandum

Decision and the State's brief all argue the same point: an expert
must be a medical doctor (or have the training and experience of a
medical doctor) in order to opine whether a person is impaired.
Appellee's Brief pg. 25.
the trial

court

ever

Neither here nor below did the State or

look

at Mr. Struempler's

education, or experience.

-13-

qualifications,

In support of its position, the State attempts to distinguish
the controlling Utah authority, State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah
1975).

Mason stands for the proposition that a person need not be

a medical doctor in order to testify to the impairing effect of
drugs.

Yet, the State argues that Struempler's testimony goes to

liability whereas the expert testimony in Mason went to testimonial
capacity.

Although

the

State's

argument

raises

a

possible

distinguishing element, the difference here is immaterial.
In Mason, as well as here, the issue is whether the proposed
expert is qualified to testify to the impairing effect of a drug,
not what element of a claim the testimony goes to. Id. at 795, 798.
The Mason Court correctly looked at the experts' qualifications and
ruled that a police officer could testify as an expert on the issue
of impairment. Id.
one does not

need

Mason stands for the proposition that in Utah,
to be a medical

doctor

to testify

to the

impairing effect of a drug.
The State also attempts to distinguish Roberts v. United
States, 316 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir. 1963).

The State argues that the

Roberts expert had extensive training and experience in the field
of toxicology and two years of scientific work in a medical school.
Id at 493.

It then argues that the present case is different

because Struempler had no medical training whatsoever. Appellee's
Brief at pg.28.

-14-

In reality, the State's argument supports Kourises' position.
The Roberts expert had two years of scientific work in a medical
school.

However, similar to the State's arguments, the Roberts

expert did not have medical training.

Yet here, Struempler not

only has extensive training and clinical experience in chemistry
and toxicology, he spent time teaching doctors in a medical school
and for the United States Navy. R. 307-311.
Finally, the State attempts to distinguish State v. Piatt, 496
S.W.2d 878 (Mo. App. 1973). The State argues:
...the challenged expert testimony was held inadmissible
for lack of materiality.
Consequently, any statement
addressing the issue of its admissibility on other
grounds is merely dictum. Appellee's Brief pg. 28.
Here, the State has failed to disclose
pertinent part of the Piatt case.

to the Court the

The Piatt court stated:

A ruling on this evidentiary point is not necessary for
the disposition of the present appeal, but will be
considered nevertheless, for the guidance of counsel and
the trial court in connection with retrial.
The
objection made at trial, that the witness was not
qualified to answer the question as an expert witness, is
without merit. A qualified chemist, particularly one
trained in toxicology, is competent to testify as to the
effect of drugs upon the human body, (citations omitted).
Id. at 884. (Emphasis added).
This is not dictum. Contrary to the State's implication, this court
is instructing its trial court on the law.
Yet in the present case, the trial court simply concluded that
because

Mr.

Struempler

was

not

automatically disqualified:
-15-

a

medical

doctor,

he

was

...The Motion to Strike should be granted for the reasons
set
forth
therein3, namely
that
because
Richard
Struempler is not a medical doctor he is unqualified to
render the opinion stated in his affidavit that Trooper
[Childs] was impaired at the time of the collision. . . . R.
610.
The trial court ignored the fact that Mr. Struempler taught medical
doctors at George Washington School of Medicine, and, for the U.S.
Navy R. 307-311; it ignored the fact that he has published numerous
articles on drugs, impairment, and drug metabolites Id. ; it ignored
the fact that as an expert witness for the United States Navy, he
has been qualified in over a hundred cases to testify to similar
issues in state and federal courts Id.; and, it ignored the fact
that as a clinical chemist with training in toxicology, his job for
over twenty five years has been dealing with drugs in people and
how those drugs effect them.
B.

Struempler's Opinion was not Speculative.
The

State

speculative.

also

argues

that

Mr.

Struempler's

Appellee's Brief pg. 2 6-27.

opinion

was

This argument was not

preserved below and should not be considered. Julian v. State, 966
P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998).

Nevertheless, a review of Struempler's

entire affidavit shows his opinion was not speculation.
3

In the

The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that granting a
motion for reasons set forth in a supporting memorandum is
insufficient. Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 34 P.3d 234 (Ut.
App. 2001). It held that the presumption of correctness
ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has little operative
effect when [the court] cannot divine the trial court's reasoning
because of a cryptic ruling. Id. citing Allen v. Prudential 83 9
P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992).
-16-

affidavit, Mr. Struempler discusses the materials he reviewed, his
findings, what the literature says about the drugs, and then offers
his opinion. R. 304-306.

Mr. Struempler's opinion was clear and

unequivocal:
fl2 . In my opinion, Mr. Childs was impaired by use
of these medications at the time of the motor vehicle
accident on 7/19/98. R. 306.
C.

Medical Malpractice Cases are Not Applicable.
In its brief, the State argues that it has offered substantial

authority

for the proposition

testify to impairment.

that

only

a medical

doctor may

The State's cases are incorporated by

reference to arguments it made to the trial court.

There, the

State presented a series of medical malpractice cases: Fitz v.
Synthes Inc., 990 P.2d 391 (Utah 1999), Fredericksen v. Maw, 227
P.2d 772 (Utah 1951), Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App.
1988), Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App.
1997), Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah App. 1994).
The State cited these as support for the proposition that
expert

medical

causation.

testimony

is

required

to

establish

medical

It argues that because Struempler is not a medical

doctor he cannot testify that Trooper Childs' use of drugs "caused"
the accident.

This argument is misplaced because impairment and

medical causation are completely different concepts.
The cases referred to by the State are all medical malpractice
or medical device injury cases.

-17-

In that realm, the issue of

medical causation is an essential element of the medical cause of
action: Did the breach of the medical standard of care
faulty medical device) cause the injuries claimed?

(or the

Typically,

there must be expert medical testimony on this issue because the
necessary knowledge is beyond that of the average jurors.
The present

case is significantly different. The question

before the court was impairment, not medical causation.

As argued

above, drug induced impairment can be established by non-medical
expert testimony.
However, the State has offered no support whatsoever for its
proposition

that

where

there

is

an

alleged

impairment,

the

causation of a car accident must be established by expert medical
testimony.
cases

a

There is no such requirement in Utah because in most

jury

can

look

at

the

evidence

and

come

to

its

own

conclusion as to whether the impairment contributed to the crash.
Thus, the cases cited by the State do not support the trial court's
conclusion

that

Kouris

must

have

expert

medicail

causation

testimony.
D.

Driving With Controlled Substances in the Blood is Prohibited
Regardless of Impairment.
Utah Code §41-6-44.6 prevents anyone from driving a car if

they have a controlled substance in their blood.

The legislature

passed this statute because of the inherent dangers of driving
while under the influence of a controlled substance, whether or not
one is visibly impaired. See Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.6.
-18-

Yet, the State argues that all drug testimony is inadmissible
because
pg. 29.

there

is no

evidence

of

impairment. Appellee's

Brief

However, the question of impairment under 41-6-44.6 is

irrelevant because it is not an element of the statute.

Thus, it

is unlawful for one to drive with a controlled substance in their
blood, even if unimpaired.
Ironically, the Highway Patrol is the agency charged with
enforcing this statute.

It was the Highway Patrol's responsibility

to protect Michael from drivers with controlled substances in their
blood.

It was the Highway Patrol that allowed Trooper Childs to

drive with controlled substances in his blood.

R. 377. The Highway

Patrol knowingly let Trooper Childs drive for years when some of
its own doctors warned that it was dangerous and recommended he not
be allowed to drive. R. 559.
The State specifically knew he had a drug problem.
doctors that

said he was impaired and that he displayed drug

seeking behavior.
supervisors
problem.

It hired

not

The Highway Patrol instructed Trooper Childs'
to

R. 377.

ask

about,

question,

or

discuss

his

drug

Finally, a few months after Michael's death,

when Trooper Childs nearly killed a fellow officer, the Highway
Patrol finally took him off the road.
to drive because of his drug use.

-19-

It concluded he was unsafe

R. 578, 652 pg. 3.

POINT V
THE STATE'S TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS ARE UNFOUNDED
Throughout the State's brief, it raised a number of issues
that

address

technicalities

Kourises' arguments.

as

opposed

to

the

substance

of

Moreover, for the most part, these technical

arguments arise from the States incomplete review of the record. In
order to keep the preceding substantive replies concise, Kourises
have addressed the State's technical arguments here under a single
heading.
1.

The Complaint Adequately Covers All of Kourises' Causes of
Action.
The State asserts that the Kourises have

re-characterized

their claims from a negligence claim to a negligent supervision
claim.

Appellee's Brief p.10.

On December 28, 1998, Kourises filed a negligence and wrongful
death complaint against the Utah Highway Patrol, the State of Utah,
and Cortland Childs. R.l.

The complaint sought a judgment against

each defendant. R.5. It sought a judgment against Cortland Childs
for his negligence.

Separately, under the doctrine of vicarious

liability, it sought a judgment against the Highway Patrol and the
State of Utah for the negligence of their employee while in the
course and scope of his employment. R. 3-5.
Based

on

early

discovery

of

the

narcotic

medications

in

Trooper Childs' system, and his long and significant drug history
while an employee of the Highway Patrol, Kourises filed an amended
-20-

complaint adding a cause of action against the Highway Patrol for
negligent hiring, training, and supervision, as well as a cause of
action for violation of Kourises' civil rights.

R. 62-68.

The State filed several summary judgment motions including one
opposing the individual claim against Cortland Childs. R. 115, 138.
The State's trial counsel argued that the governmental immunity act
immunized state employees from individual liability while acting in
the course and scope of their employment. R.13 8-39.
the

issues,

Kourises

agreed

to

dismiss

the

To simplify

individual

claim

purporting to hold Trooper Childs personally liable. R. 651 at
pg.9.
The vicarious liability claims against the Highway Patrol and
the State for Trooper Childs' negligence as an employee, were never
dismissed.

This is clear not only from the procedural history of

the case, but also from the oral arguments

that

followed the

dismissal of the individual claim.
...Well we're down to, urn, a negligent supervision
claim and [] negligence claim, Your Honor, at this
point, cause the civil rights claims have gone away
and the individual claims against Trooper Childs
have gone away...Sandra Steinvoort, Defendants'
Trial Counsel, R. 652 p.5. (See also R. 651 pp.925.
This case still contains a negligence/wrongful death claim
against the State and the Highway Patrol for the negligence of its
employee Trooper Childs.

It also contains a negligent supervision

claim against the State and the Highway Patrol. R.62

-21-

2.

Statutory Construction was Extensively Argued Below.
The State argues that the Kourises' statutory construction

argument was not preserved below. Appellee's Brief p.14. However,
it was preserved in the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment. R. 360-369.

Additionally, it was preserved at

oral argument in lengthy argument from both sides over the precise
issue. R. 652 pp.25-48.
3.

Michael's Disputed Location at Impact was Argued Below.
The

State argues

that

Kourises did

Michael was in the crosswalk.

not

raise below

Thus, it contends that Kourises

cannot raise that issue here. Appellee's Brief p. 19, 20.
argument is without merit.

that

That

The following testimony was argued

extensively in Kourises' pleadings below and at oral arguments:
...It made no sense that the police officer, with the
kids crossing the crosswalk, would turn on his lights and
speed off like that. R.363, 416, 548, 651 pg.2., 652 pg.46
(Emphasis added).
4.

Kourises' Statutory Construction Argument is Proper.
As argued in Point III, a central issue in this case has

always been what duties existed and whether immunity attaches.
Kourises

propounded

construction.

The

a

line
State

of

reasoning

argued

in

based

reply

on

statutory

that

statutory

construction is not relevant because the trial court ruled immunity
was a complete defense; and, that the statutory construction was
not preserved below.

Appellee's Brief pg. 13-14.

-22-

On review of a Summary Judgment, an appellate court accords no
deference to a trial court's legal conclusions given to support the
grant

of

summary

correctness.
1112

judgment

and

reviews

those

conclusions

for

Schurtz v. B.M.W. of N. America, 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-

(Utah 1991) .

Thus, it is irrelevant that the trial court

found immunity to be a complete defense.

This Court can analyze

the statutes to determine whether the trial court was correct.
Additionally, the statutory construction issue was preserved
below. Appellant's Openincr Brief pg. 1-2. A central

issue has

always been what Utah motor vehicle statues and common-laws impose
duties on the State. In order to determine whether a statute
creates

a

duty

or

applicable statutes.

confers

immunity,

one

must

construe

the

The trial court had to do this in order to

come to its conclusion that immunity attached.

This Court is free

to use principles of statutory construction here.
5.

The State Improperly Alludes to the Contents of a Video.
The State alludes to a video of the accident, in support of

several of its arguments.

Appellee's Brief pg. 19.

There was

video footage captured by a nearby gas station's video surveillance
system.
poor.

However, the quality of the video is at best, extremely
Had this video been in anyway illuminating, it would have

been part of the Record in this case. It is not.

The video reveals

almost nothing, and it was never offered in evidence.

-23-

Moreover,

the State does not even cite to portions of the video, it cites to
its trial counsel's interpretation of the video. Id.
6.

Dr. Bender's Affidavit is Properly Before the Court.
The State argues that Dr. Bender's affidavit is ineffective

because it is not signed or notarized.

However, the affidavit

before the court is proper. See Exh. C.
Kourises have no explanation why the original signed affidavit
does not appear in the Record.

It was filed with the trial court

and hand delivered to the Attorney General.

The affidavit and its

contents were argued at oral arguments on the Motion to Reconsider.
R.

653.

Neither

the

trial

court

nor

the

State

raised

any

objections because both had a signed copy in their possession.
Therefore, since the trial court reviewed and made legal rulings on
Dr. Bender's

signed affidavit; and, no objections were

raised

below, it is properly before this Court.
V.
CONCLUSION
In its decision granting Summary Judgment, the trial court
made several errors which require that the Summary Judgment be
reversed.

The trial court improperly weighed or ignored evidence

on impairment, the emergency vehicle statute, and on the accident
itself.

An additional critical piece of evidence was

Richard

Struempler's expert opinion that Trooper Childs was impaired.
trial

court

abused

its discretion by excluding

-24-

this

The

testimony

because Struempler was not a medical doctor. Based on the disputed
facts and the impairment evidence, there can be no immunity.
However, even if the facts are undisputed, Trooper Childs
violated duties for which there is no immunity.

These duties

include a duty of care under the circumstances; a duty not to drive
while impaired or with a controlled substance in ones body; a duty
not to pass a car at a crosswalk; and, a heightened duty of care
with children present.

The State appears to have conceded these

duties.
Therefore, the Kourises submit that this Court should remand
this case for a trial of the facts with the testimony of Richard
Struempler.

So as to avoid further appeals, Kourises respectfully

suggest that this Court instruct the parties on the issues of duty
and governmental immunity.
DATED this

/

day of

y ¥ I OjlCK^

, 2002.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for AppeU3£its

WARREN W. DRIGGS
J. BRADFORD DeBRY
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EXHIBIT A

2.

EXHIBIT B

Pages 2-3

3.

EXHIBIT C

Pages 4-7
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Tab A

EXHIBIT A

41-6-14

(1998) states as follows:

(1)
The operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle, when responding to an
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an
actual or suspected violator of the law or
when responding to but not upon returning
from a fire alarm, may exercise the
privileges under this section, subject to
Subsections (2) through (4).
(2)
The operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle may:
(A)
(B)

(C)
(D)

park or stand, irrespective of the
provisions of this chapter;
proceed past a red or stop signal or
stop sign, but only after slowing down
as may be necessary for safe operation;
exceed the maximum speed limits; or
disregard regulations governing
direction or movement or turning in
specified directions.

(3)
Privileges granted under this
section to the operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a
vehicle pursuit, apply only when the operator
of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under
Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as
defined under Section 41-6-132, which is
visible from in front of the vehicle.

TabB
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Tuesday, December 21, 1999: 1,1:15 a.m.

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR PLAINTIFFS:

TRACY ALLRED,

Mr. Warren W. Driggs

called as a witness, having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT

84107

EXAMINATION
FOR DEFENDANT:

BY MR. DRIGGS:

Mr. J. Wesley Robinson
Assistant Attorney General
3 60 East 300 South, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Q. Mr. Allred, will you please state your
name for the record?
A. My name is Tracy Allred.
Q. And how old are you, sir?
A. ITm 41 years old.
Q. And where do you work?
A. I'm a patrol officer with the Price
City Police Department
Q. How long have you been employed as a
patrol officer with Price City?
A. A little over ten years.
Q. And before that what did you do?
A. I was a patrol officer with the Helper
City Police Department.
Q. For what period of time?
A. Three years and four months.
A~A

U~C

f^r ihf* Pltv

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
|23
24
|25

Page 49
49
Ptge^i
if you are notified over your radio that someone is
1 started that way.
breaking the law and you're asked to go check it
2
Q. Did you put on your siren?
out, would that be pursuit?
3
A. No.
A. No.
4
Q. Did you put on your lights?
Q. Why not?
| 5
A. No.
A. A vehicle pursuit would be when I'm
| 6
Q. Did you consider is it to be an
following someone, trying to get them to pull
7 emergency?
over. That would be just a response call.
8
A. No, I didn't. I was out, it was
Q. Okay. A response call. Is a response
9 ineffective, it wouldn't matter if put my lights on
call an emergency?
10 and siren, I would have been ineffective anyway.
A. It depends on the call.
11 It would have been by. So I just tried to get
Q. Okay.
12 there as fast as I could.
A. A family fight would be a Code 3
13
Q. Did you exceed the speed limit on your
emergency call. You might get an accident and
14 way?
that's a Code 1 call, where you just respond
15
A. Not that I recall.
normally. Get there when you get there.
16
Q. You didn't really regard that to be an
Q. Okay. You don't know what this call
17 emergency?
was that he got? You don't know what level of
18
A. Well, I tried to get there as soon as I
emergency or response?
19 could, but at the same time I didn't activate my
A. What I heard it over the radio, to me
20 overhead lights or anything like that.
that's just a violator call.
21
Q. Okay. You didn't think that was
Q. Did you hear it over the radio?
22 necessary?
A. Yes, 1 did.
23
A. Not from where 1 was coming from.
Q. Did you hear this very thing over the
24
Q. Did you ever hear Cortland Childs's
radio?
25 response to the thing that you heard?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
\l5
116
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 52
Page 50 ,
A. Yes, 1 did.
1
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Okay. And what did you hear?
2
Q. What did he say?
A. Well, 29 Alpha 11 was going up Carbon
3
A. He said, "I'm on Carbon Avenue, I'll go
Avenue — and I put this together through the
4 ahead and see if I can't catch up to it."
5
Q. Okay. Is that what he said, or is that
conversations -- and 1 notified dispatch that there
was a kid holding the tmnk closed, they were going
6 the gist of what he said?
7
A. Something like that, yes. I can't
north on Carbon Avenue, gave a location, and
S g t Drolc asked where I was; I was at K-Mart.
8 remember his exact words.
9
Q. Okay. Then what's the next thing you
Q. Where was St. Drolc?
10 heard?
A. I don't know.
11
A. Just the 10-33 call that he gave.
Q. Was he in his car?
12
Q. Okay. Was that — let me back up. Was
A. Oh, he was in his patrol car, yes.
13
that
call that you heard describing a kid in the
Q. So when you heard Jeremiah Davies call
14 trunk, was that on Channel 3 or was that — do you
to dispatch-15 know?
A. He was on his hand-held.
16
A. 1 can't remember.
Q. Okay. He called into dispatch and
17
Q. Okay.
that's what you heard?
18
A. I believe the first conversation
A. That's correct.
19 between Jeremiah and the dispatcher was on
Q. And you heard him describe a child in a
trunk trying to hold the lid down?
20 Channel 4.
A. That's correct.
21
Q. So that initial conversation, Jeremiah
Q. Okay. And then what?
22 Davies is describing the child in the trunk?
A. Then I started that way, Sgt. Drolc
23
A. That's correct.
asked me how close I was, and I said, hey, I'm at
24
Q. After that communication, you hear
600 West, Second South, I'm a ways out. So it
25 Cortland Childs say, "I'm close, I'll check it
* - • » » A ^TTT-VT Y*»Tfc

r«Cl>
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WARREN W. DRIGGS A4 02 7
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL KOURIS, individually,
and for the ESTATE OF MICHAEL
KOURIS, a deceased minor; and
PAM KOURIS, individually,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BENDER, M.D.

)

Civil No. 980700823 PI

)

Judge Bruce K. Halliday

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL, STATE OF
UTAH, and CORTLAND CHILDS,
Defendants.
STATE OF COLORADO
.

)
) SS:

COUNTY OF y v ^ - ^ a u ^ ^
COMES NOW, JOHN BENDER, M.D., and having first been duly
sworn under oath states and asserts as follows:
1.

I am a licensed physician in the State of Utah.

have practiced medicine for 38 years.

I

From approximately 1972

through 1997 my specialty was physical medicine and rehabilitation.
I served as the medical director for Stewart Rehabilitation at
McKay-Dee Hospital in Ogden, Utah.

I have also served as medical

director of Western Rehabilitation Institute in Sandy, Utah (now
referred to as HealthSouth Rehabilitation Center).

I have also

worked at Holy Cross/St. Benedict's Hospitals in both Salt Lake and
Ogden.

My specialty was chronic pain management.

I am very

familiar

with

management.
education,

issues
I

surrounding

believe

training,

I

am

medication

uniquely

and experience

use

qualified

to address

for

pain

through

my

the issues and

opinions raised in this Affidavit.
2.

I personally

performed

a medical

Trooper Cortland Childs on November 12, 1991.

evaluation

I generated a report

on that date as a result of that interview and examination.
prepared two follow-up letters.

of

I also

My initial report and follow-up

letters are attached as Exhibit B.
3.
reviewed

the

In

addition

medical

to

my

medical

examination,

records

of

Trooper

Childs

physicians and other medical personnel
through 1999.

I

have

generated

from approximately

by

1991

Included in those records were, among other things,

summaries of Trooper Childs' prescription drug history during that
period of time.
4.

I have also reviewed the toxicology reports that

were generated shortly after the Kouris accident.
5.

I have also reviewed Trooper Childs' personnel file

which includes, among other things, correspondence, memoranda, and
reports commenting

on his drug use, disability,

and potential

impairment from drug use while on the job.
6.

Based

upon

my

experience,

education,

training,

medical examination, and a review of the aforementioned documents,
I can offer the following opinions:

2

a.

At the time of my examination, Mr. Childs was

impaired by virtue of his narcotic prescription drug use.

It

was my opinion at that time that he should not drive a patrol
car, unless and until he was weaned from the drugs he was
taking.
b.

It appears from the records I have reviewed

that, since my examination, Trooper Childs was not weaned from
his narcotic prescription drug use.

In fact, at the time of

the Kouris accident, it appears he was taking nearly three
times the amount of controlled narcotic medications than he
was taking at the time of my previous examination.
c.

Trooper Childs' regimen for use of narcotic

pain medications was inconsistent with accepted practices of
long-term

pain

management

through

the

use

of

narcotic

medication.
d.
year

or

It appears from his personnel file that, in the

two before

the

Kouris

accident,

he

demonstrated

erratic behavior, and was involved in other motor vehicle
accidents (or near accidents) where, by his own admission, his
judgment was impaired.

It is my opinion that these incidents

were consistent with a person who is addicted to prescription
medication and impaired by its effects.
e.

I

have

reviewed

the

Affidavit

of

Richard

Struempler, a toxicologist hired by the Kouris family.

I

agree with the statements and conclusions he made in that
3

Affidavit.

Moreover, I believe he is qualified to address

issues concerning the amount of controlled substances in the
body and its relationship to prescribed dosages.
f.

To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I

believe Trooper Childs was impaired by the use of narcotic
medications at the time that his car struck and killed Michael
Kouris.
DATED this ft d L day of

(^ c X ^ U v

, 2000.
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